首页|Reinsurance games with $\boldsymbol{{n}}$ variance-premium reinsurers: from tree to chain
Reinsurance games with $\boldsymbol{{n}}$ variance-premium reinsurers: from tree to chain
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NETL
NSTL
Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract This paper studies dynamic reinsurance contracting and competition problems under model ambiguity in a reinsurance market with one primary insurer and n reinsurers, who apply the variance premium principle and who are distinguished by their levels of ambiguity aversion. The insurer negotiates reinsurance policies with all reinsurers simultaneously, which leads to a reinsurance tree structure with full competition among the reinsurers. We model the reinsurance contracting problems between the insurer and reinsurers by Stackelberg differential games and the competition among the reinsurers by a non-cooperative Nash game. We derive equilibrium strategies in semi-closed form for all the companies, whose objective is to maximize their expected surpluses penalized by a squared-error divergence term that measures their ambiguity. We find that, in equilibrium, the insurer purchases a positive amount of proportional reinsurance from each reinsurer. We further show that the insurer always prefers the tree structure to the chain structure, in which the risk of the insurer is shared sequentially among all reinsurers.
Game theoryStackelberg differential gamenon-cooperative Nash gameoptimal reinsuranceambiguityvariance premium principle
NETL
NSTL
Cambridge Univ Press
