首页|Optimal R&D disclosure in network industries

Optimal R&D disclosure in network industries

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  • NETL
  • NSTL
  • Elsevier
The R&D literature framed in a strategic context shows two unpleasant outcomes for the public goods nature of knowledge: 1) the private R&D activity results in under-investment (with no information leakage - no spillovers) or over-investment (with information leakage - positive spillovers) compared to the social optimum because of appropriability, and 2) the R&D outcome shared by each firm is lower than full disclosure, as innovators are not rewarded for disseminating information. This article departs from De Bondt et al. (1992), who consider the cost-reducing (process) innovation duopoly a la d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) with non-network goods showing that the (second-best) social optimum requires partial disclosure if products are homogeneous. Unlike these studies, this work finds that, in a network industry, full disclosure becomes optimal depending on the extent of the network externality. Results offer clear policy implications.

DuopolyInformation-sharingR&D investments

Domenico Buccella、Luciano Fanti、Luca Gori

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Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Jagiellonska Street, 57/59, 03301 Warsaw, Poland

Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10, 1-56124 Pisa, PI, Italy

Department of Law, University of Pisa,Via Collegio Ricci, 10, 1-56126 Pisa, PI, Italy||GLO, Germany

2023

10.1016/j.ecosys.2023.101144

Economic systems

Economic systems

ISSN：0939-3625
年,卷(期)：2023.47(4)
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