摘要
近十年来，政府机构为台湾东部的康复交通服务提供了大量补贴，但需求满足率低、医疗和交通资源有限、旅行距离长、死亡里程百分比极高仍然是康复交通服务提供者面临的主要挑战。本研究运用市场设计理论，将康复巴士与病人需求相匹配，以提高农村资源利用效率。发达的市场设计机制旨在通过使用延迟接受算法和顶部交易周期方法，以匹配的方式将资源分配给最需要资源的人。该模型是根据那些根据期望的登机时间选择康复巴士的人的请求初始化的。另一方面，康复巴士的服务提供者将根据病人的残疾水平、分享乘坐的意愿、本月完成的预约数量以及这次旅行的旅行距离作为优先顺序来确定病人的时间表。由于现时的车辆调度规则是以先到先得的方式预留康复巴士座位，不能完全满足病人的需要。根据历史数据，72个需求请求中的63个可以成功预订座位。在"先到先得"模式下，48个请求获得了排名第一的转变（即他们期望的时间段），他们的残疾水平分数之和为155.在市场设计匹配模式下，57个请求获得了一级移位，其残疾等级得分之和为170，表明所提出的市场设计匹配机制优于传统规则。
Abstract
Government agencies provide huge amount of subsidies to support the rehabilitation transportation service over the past decade in eastern Taiwan; however, low demand request fulfillment rate, limited medical and transportation resources, long travel distances, and an extremely high percentage of dead mileages are still the main challenges faced by rehabilitation transportation service providers. This study applies the market design theory to match the rehabilitation buses with the requests of patients, so as to improve resource utilization efficiency in rural areas. The developed market design mechanisms aim to allocate resources to those who need them most in a matching manner, by using the deferred acceptance algorithm and the top trading cycle approach. The model is initialized with the requests of those who choose the rehabilitation bus based on their desired boarding time slots. On the other hand, the service providers of the rehabilitation bus would determine patients’ schedule based on their disability level, willingness to share the ride, number of fulfilled appointments during this month, and the travel distance of this trip as the order of preference. Since the current vehicle dispatching rule is to reserve seats of a rehabilitation bus on the “first-come-first-served” basis, and it cannot fully satisfy patients need. In accordance with the historical data, 63 of 72 demand requests could successfully reserve the seats. In the “first-come, first-served” mode, 48 requests obtained the first-ranking shift (i.e., their desired time slots), and the sum of their disability level score is 155. In the market design matching mode, 57 requests obtained the first-ranking shift, and the sum of their disability level score is 170, which demonstrates that the proposed market design matching mechanism outperforms than the conventional rules.
NETL
NSTL
Wiley-Hindawi