首页|Toeholds and information quality in common‐value takeover auctions
Toeholds and information quality in common‐value takeover auctions
扫码查看
点击上方二维码区域，可以放大扫码查看
原文链接
NETL
NSTL
Wiley
In this article I analyze the effect of the sensitivity of firm value on the information available to potential acquirers in common‐value takeover auctions with toeholds. I show that the quality of information does not affect equilibrium when bidders have equal toeholds but has a significant effect when toeholds are different. My article demon- strates that increasing the relative information quality of the bidder with a smaller toehold makes both bidders bid more aggressively and leads to a higher price. I also analyze the combined effect of toeholds and information quality on equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss ways target shareholders can increase the expected final price.
Anna Dodonova
展开 >
Telfer School of Management,University of Ottawa,Ottawa,Ontario,Canada
NETL
NSTL
Wiley
