首页|An Efficient Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption Scheme for Multi-User Range Queries

An Efficient Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption Scheme for Multi-User Range Queries

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  • NETL
  • NSTL
  • IEEE
To balance data confidentiality and availability, order-revealing encryption (ORE) has emerged as a pivotal primitive facilitating range queries on encrypted data. However, challenges arise in diverse user domains where data is encrypted with different keys, giving rise to the development of delegatable order-revealing encryption (DORE) schemes. Regrettably, existing DORE schemes are susceptible to authorization token forgery attacks and rely on computationally intensive bilinear pairings. This work proposes a novel solution to address these challenges. We first introduce a delegatable equality-revealing encryption scheme, enabling the comparison of ciphertexts encrypted by distinct secret keys through authorization tokens. Building upon this, we present a delegatable order-revealing encryption that leverages bitwise encryption. DORE supports efficient multi-user ciphertext comparison while robustly resisting authorization token forgery attacks. Significantly, our approach distinguishes itself by minimizing bilinear pairings. Experimental results highlight the efficacy of DORE, showcasing a notable speedup of $2.8\times$ in encryption performance and $1.33\times$ in comparison performance compared to previous DORE schemes, respectively.

EncryptionCryptographySecurityAuthorizationForgeryCloud computingEncodingResistsPublic keyData privacy

Jingru Xu、Cong Peng、Rui Li、Jintao Fu、Min Luo

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School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China

Shandong Inspur Science Research Institute Company, Ltd., Jinan, China

Inspur Intelligent Technology Company, Ltd., Jinan, China

School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China|Shanghai Technology Innovation Centre of Distributed Privacy-Preserving Artificial Intelligence, Matrix Elements Technologies, Shanghai, China

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2025

10.1109/TCC.2024.3506614

IEEE transactions on cloud computing

IEEE transactions on cloud computing

ISSN：
年,卷(期)：2025.13(1)
  • 37