Noncooperative Games With Prospect Theoretic Preferences

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NETL
NSTL
IEEE

外文摘要：We study noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs, where agents display irrational behaviors in response to underlying risk factors. Our formulation incorporates prospect theory, a behavioral model used to describe agents’ risk attitude, into the equilibrium theory of noncooperative $N-$ agent games. We show that the resulting nonconvex nonsmooth game admits equilibria and provide convergence guarantees for their computation. Further, the concept of “Price of Irrationality” is introduced to quantify the suboptimality induced by irrational behaviors. Finally, we provide bounds on the performance of a class of prospect theoretic aggregative games and illustrate our results on an electricity market game.

外文关键词：

GamesJacobian matricesDistortion measurementUncertaintyTrainingSensitivityQ measurementDistortionData miningConvergence

作者：

Marta Fochesato、Frédy Pokou、Hélène Le Cadre、John Lygeros

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作者单位：

Automatic Control Laboratory, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

Inria, CNRS, University of Lille, Centrale, Lille, UMR 9189 CRIStAL, Lille, France

出版年：

2025

DOI：

10.1109/LCSYS.2025.3548956

IEEE Control Systems Letters

ISSN：

年,卷(期)：2025.9(1)

参考文献量31