首页|Lyapunov-Certified Resilient Secondary Defense Strategies of AC Microgrids Under Exponentially Energy-Unbounded FDI Attacks
Lyapunov-Certified Resilient Secondary Defense Strategies of AC Microgrids Under Exponentially Energy-Unbounded FDI Attacks
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This letter presents fully distributed Lyapunov-certified resilient secondary defense strategies for islanded inverter-based AC microgrids, designed to counter a broad spectrum of exponentially energy-unbounded false data injection (EEU-FDI) attacks, targeting control input channels. While distributed control improves scalability and reliability, it also increases susceptibility to cyber threats. The proposed defense strategies, supported by rigorous Lyapunov-based proofs, ensure uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence for frequency regulation, voltage containment, and power sharing, even under EEU-FDI attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed defense strategies has been demonstrated through case studies on a modified IEEE 34-bus system, leveraging simulations and real-time controller hardware-in-the-loop experiments using OPAL-RT.
Frequency controlVoltage controlMicrogridsInvertersStability analysisDecentralized controlProtocolsPower system stabilityActuatorsScalability
Mohamadamin Rajabinezhad、Nesa Shams、Asad Ali Khan、Omar A. Beg、Shan Zuo
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Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Connecticut, Mansfield, CT, USA
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA
Department of Electrical Engineering, The University of Texas Permian Basin, Odessa, TX, USA
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