首页|The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China
The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China
扫码查看
点击上方二维码区域，可以放大扫码查看
原文链接
NSTL
Elsevier
In January 2002, China decided to centralize corporate income tax collection, shifting the collection authority from the local tax bureaus (LTBs) to the state tax bureaus (STBs), for all firms established after December 31, 2001. We exploit this exogenous shock to identify a new cause for corporate bribery, namely, the complicit role of local government authorities. We find that firms whose income taxes are still collected by LTBs after the reform bribe more than similar firms whose taxes are collected by STBs. Such effects are more pronounced for firms located in provinces where government intervention is more prevalent and where judicial system is less independent. Moreover, we find that firms whose taxes are collected by LTBs enjoy lower tax burdens and receive greater tax-related subsidies, especially when they bribe more. Overall, our results highlight the reciprocation between local government authorities and firms in determining corporate bribery.
Tax collectionCorporate briberyLocal government complicity
Cao, Chunfang、Li, Xiaoyang、Xia, Changyuan
展开 >
Sun Yat Sen Univ, Business Sch, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Deakin Univ, Deakin Business Sch, Geelong, Vic, Australia
Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Insurance, Chengdu, Peoples R China
NSTL
Elsevier
