首页|Evolution of stakeholders' behavioral strategies in the ecological compensation mechanism for poverty alleviation
Evolution of stakeholders' behavioral strategies in the ecological compensation mechanism for poverty alleviation
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NSTL
Elsevier
Because poverty and natural resource conservation are multi-dimensional, complex interactive processes, ecological compensation (EC) mechanism, which is global environmental resource management policy instruments, have become important tools for poverty alleviation. This study developed a unified analysis framework that incorporated a tripartite evolutionary game that included EC-investors, who promote eco-compensated poverty alleviation, EC-providers, and superior government regulators. Based on proposed dynamic replicator equations, the evolution and steady state strategies for each of these stakeholders were then separately discussed. A numerical study based on the observable conditions in an eco-compensated poverty alleviation project was conducted to examine the asymptotic stability of the various evolutionary stabilization strategies. The results show that the government regulator's strategic choices act as a "weathervane" for the other two players, and the choice of the superior government regulator depends on the expected benefits and costs of the strategy. The strategic choices made by the EC-providers are significantly influenced by the EC-investor strategy choices, with a sufficient ecological transfer payment being the main motivation for the providers to participate in the eco-compensated poverty alleviation projects.
NSTL
Elsevier
