首页|Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas
Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas
扫码查看
点击上方二维码区域，可以放大扫码查看
原文链接
NSTL
Elsevier
We investigate the evolution of cooperation with a bilaterally-agree partner switching mechanism in which two players rather than one determine whether to break a link. In this mechanism, we define an edge game to describe this bilateral consultation process. Through analyzing the Pure Nash Equilibrium of this game, we find that defectors intend to keep in touch with cooperators while cooperators prefer to break links with defectors in most cases. However, introducing such a mechanism results in that a defector would transfer part of his payoff to his cooperative neighbors conditionally, which maintains the link between cooperators and defectors. Besides, this transfer narrows the payoff gap between the two types of players and therefore promotes the propagation of cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of consultation on the realization of global cooperation. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
NSTL
Elsevier
