首页|Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
扫码查看
点击上方二维码区域，可以放大扫码查看
原文链接
NSTL
Elsevier
Individual selection, as an effective mechanism, is often used in spatial evolutionary games to promote cooperation. Previous research assumes that, individual selection usually occurs with people who fail to meet a certain criterion. However, individual selection is usually inevitable, regardless of whether players in population cooperate or defect. This paper studies the effects of wealth-based rule in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable. Specifically, we assume that only the top V individuals with relatively high cumulative payoffs in each group can be selected for costly PGG. The results show that when V is large, the increase of participation cost has slight inhibitory effects on the evolution of cooperation, but it alleviates the polarization of individuals. However, when V is small, the increase of participation cost within a certain range promotes cooperation prosperity, but it also causes an increase in the proportion of polarized individuals and a widening of the wealth gap between rich and poor individuals. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
NSTL
Elsevier
