首页期刊导航|Economic theory
期刊信息/Journal information
Economic theory
Springer
Economic theory

Springer

月刊

0938-2259

Economic theory/Journal Economic theory
正式出版
收录年代

    On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

    Andriy Zapechelnyuk
    1051-1067页
    查看更多>>摘要：We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by an uninformed principal (who has no information about the state of the world when making her choice) and by an informed principal (who has private information and can condition her choice on that information). We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers

    Matt Van EssenJohn Wooders
    1069-1114页
    查看更多>>摘要：We study the bargaining problem of allocating homogeneous goods or chores when participants have equal claim to a unit of the good or equal obligation to undertake a chore. We propose two sequential auctions for solving problems of this type: a sequential ascending clock "goods" auction and a sequential descending clock "chore" auction, which are duals of one another. Either auction can be used for allocating goods or chores by suitably defining a good or a chore. The auctions are budget balanced, ex-post efficient and, when bidders are risk neutral, payoff equivalent. We characterize equilibrium bidding under constant absolute risk aversion and show that equilibrium converges to maxmin perfect bidding in the limit as bidders become infinitely risk averse. Connecting these results to cooperative game theory, we show that under maxmin perfect bidding the ascending clock goods auction gives each bidder his normative Shapley value allocation, while the descending clock chore auction gives each bidder his strategic Shapley value allocation. These two Shapley value allocations have different fairness interpretations, and thus the choice of the auction format determines which fair allocation results.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Revealed preference tests for price competition in multi-product differentiated markets

    Yuta Yasui
    1115-1144页
    查看更多>>摘要：Assumptions of competitive structure are often crucial for marginal cost estimation and counterfactual predictions. This paper introduces tests for price competition among multi-product firms. The tests are based on the firm's revealed preference (revealed profit function). In contrast to other approaches based on estimated demand functions such as conduct parameter estimation, the proposed tests do not require any instrumental variables, even though the models can accommodate structural error terms. In this paper, I employ a demand structure introduced by Nocke and Schutz , the discrete/continuous choice model, which nests the multinomial logit demand and CES demand functions. Any price and quantity data can be rationalized by price competition under a discrete/continuous choice model and increasing marginal costs. Adding more assumptions to the demand functions, such as logit, CES, or the co-evolving and log-concave property produces some falsifiable restrictions.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?

    Battal DoganM. Bumin Yenmez
    1145-1173页
    查看更多>>摘要：We study multistage centralized assignment systems to allocate scarce resources based on priorities in the context of school choice. We characterize schools' capacity-priority profiles under which an additional stage of assignment may improve student welfare when the deferred acceptance algorithm is used at each stage. If the capacity-priority profile is acyclic, then no student prefers any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of the 2-stage system to the truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage system. If the capacity-priority profile is not acyclic, then an SPNE outcome of the 2-stage system may Pareto dominate the truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the 1 -stage system. If students are restricted to playing truncation strategies, an additional stage unambiguously improves student welfare: no student prefers the truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage system to any SPNE outcome of the 2-stage system.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Computing revealed preference goodness-of-fit measures with integer programming

    Thomas DemuynckJohn Rehbeck
    1175-1195页
    查看更多>>摘要：This paper develops mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulations to compute various revealed preference goodness-of-fit measures. We provide MILP formulations to compute the Houtman-Maks index, the average Varian index, and the minimum cost index when there are linear budgets. Next, we provide MILPs to compute minimal "measurement error" in expenditures, prices, and quantities. Finally, we extend our results to non-linear budgets. As a proof of concept, we compute various goodness-of-fit measures for experimental choice data sets from the literature. The maximal computation time is less than 3 s for all measures examined on these datasets.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans

    Redouane ElkamhiLatchezar PopovRaunaq S. Pungaliya
    1197-1255页
    查看更多>>摘要：We develop a model of financial maintenance covenants under moral hazard, adverse selection, and informative signals of varying quality. We explain how public signals can improve the outcome for lenders and borrowers by reducing inefficient risk-taking (in both the pooling and separating equilibrium), and by shielding good firms from the actions of bad (separating) ones. We find that a reduction in signal quality moves the equilibrium from pooling to separating, to no covenants at all. We also demonstrate that signal quality has a non-monotone effect on covenant strictness. In an extension, we model manipulation of the accounting signal and show that it is isomorphic to a particular kind of noise.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Behavioral strong implementation

    T. HayashiR. JainV. KorpelaM. Lombardi...
    1257-1287页
    查看更多>>摘要：Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players' choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Cooperative teaching and learning of actions

    Yangbo SongMofei Zhao
    1289-1327页
    查看更多>>摘要：This paper studies a novel game-theoretic setting: players may acquire new actions over time by observing the opponent's play. We model this scenario as finitely repeated games where players' action sets are private information and may endogenously expand over time. Three main implications emerge from this framework and its equilibria. First, players may target a payoff vector for the long run and voluntarily "teach" one another the actions needed in early periods. The action profile will be learned and sustained as long as each action is available to either player. Second, when no payoff target is prefixed, the players can always obtain or approximate strict ex-post efficiency via bilateral teaching and learning. Third, an alternative economic argument now exists for seemingly irrational cooperative behavior in games with finite horizon. For instance, fully rational players can play a cooperative equilibrium even if the stage game remains a Prisoner's Dilemma for everyone.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions

    Galit Ashkenazi-GolanYevgeny TsodikovichYannick Viossat
    1329-1362页
    查看更多>>摘要：A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a best and final offer stage. This improved bid can depend on new information either about the asset or about the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information structures. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when less additional information is made available to the bidders regarding the competition. It follows that when the number of bidders is a priori unknown, there are some advantages to the auctioneer not revealing information and conducting a one-stage auction instead.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature

    Influential news and policy-making

    Federico Vaccari
    1363-1418页
    查看更多>>摘要：This paper analyzes the implications of interventions that affect the costs of misre-porting. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by the two candidates. I show that higher costs may lead to more misreporting and persuasion, whereas low costs result in full revelation. The voter may be better off when less informed because of higher costs. When the media receives policy-independent gains, interventions that increase misreporting costs never directly harm the voter. However, lenient interventions that increase these costs by small amounts can be wasteful of public resources. Regulation produced by politicians leads to suboptimal interventions.
      原文链接:
    • NETL
    • NSTL
    • Springer Nature