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Behavioral strong implementation

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  • NETL
  • NSTL
  • Springer Nature
Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players' choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.

Strong equilibriumImplementationState-contingent choice rules(behavioral) group strategy-proofnessNon-rational behavior

T. Hayashi、R. Jain、V. Korpela、M. Lombardi

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Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

University of Liverpool Management School, Liverpool, UK

Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

University of Liverpool Management School, Liverpool, UK, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Naples Federico Ⅱ and CSEF, Naples, Italy

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2023

10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0

Economic theory

Economic theory

ISSN：0938-2259
年,卷(期)：2023.76(4)
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