查看更多>>摘要：At each moment in time, an alternative from a finite set is selected by a stochastic process. Players observe the selected alternative and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes vote is decisive for the selected alternative, it is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise the next period begins. We refer to this class of problems as stopping games. Collective choice games, quitting games, and coalition formation games are particular examples.When the core of a stopping game is non-empty, a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies is shown to exist. But in general, even subgame perfect equilibria in mixed stationary strategies may not exist. We show that aggregate voting behavior can be summarized by a collective strategy. We insist on pure strategies, allow for simple forms of punishment, and provide a constructive proof to show that so-called two-step simple collective equilibria always exist. This implies the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. We apply our approach to the case with three alternatives exhibiting a Condorcet cycle and to a model of redistributive politics.(c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
查看更多>>摘要：This paper derives a closed-form solution of the AK endogenous growth model with logarithmic preferences and anticipated future consumption which enters additively into effective consumption. We get an explicit representation of the time paths of the economic variables in level by resorting to Gaussian Hypergeometric functions. We compare the model with anticipated future consumption to the model with habit formation. The maximum utility attainable in the model with anticipation is shown to be higher than the one attainable in the model with habits. Using the derived explicit expressions, we perform some comparative-dynamics and-statics analyses with respect to relevant parameters. Numerical simulations complement the theoretical results. Thus, this work provides further support to the usefulness of especial functions in the study of economic dynamics. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
van Hees, MartinJitendranath, AkshathLuttens, Roland Iwan
6页
查看更多>>摘要：A hard choice is a situation in which an agent is unable to make a justifiable choice from a given menu of alternatives. Our objective is to present a systematic treatment of the axiomatic structure of such situations. To do so, we draw on and contribute to the study of choice functions that can be indecisive, i.e., that may fail to select a non-empty set for some menus. In this more general framework, we present new characterizations of two well-known choice rules, the maximally dominant choice rule and the top-cycle choice rule. Together with existing results, this yields an understanding of the circumstances in which hard choices arise.(c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
查看更多>>摘要：Narrow framing is the idea that, when considering a monetary risk, the individual evaluates it to some extent in isolation and separately from her other risks. Originally documented in experimental settings, narrow framing has been widely applied to explain real-world investor behavior. We show that a prominent mathematical model of narrow framing presented in Barberis and Huang (2009) has some drawbacks that limit its applicability. We then propose a new model of narrow framing that overcomes these limitations and show its tractability in applications to choice over monetary gambles.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions - CSP scfs, for short - whose range is a subset of cardinality two of an arbitrary set A of alternatives. The study is conducted in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference among elements of A, and the domain of the scfs consists of preference profiles P = (Pv)v & ISIN;V over a society V of arbitrary cardinality. A representation formula for the two-valued CSP scfs is obtained that provides the structure of such functions.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, show that it is unique, and provide closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies and values. In stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all-pay auction CSF, players exert positive efforts until the very last battle in this equilibrium. We deliver a set of empirically appealing results on effort dynamics.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We analyze the first model of a group contest with players that are heterogeneous in their risk preferences. In our model, individuals' preferences are represented by a utility function exhibiting a generalized form of constant absolute risk aversion, allowing us to consider any combination of risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving players. We begin by proving equilibrium existence and uniqueness under both linear and convex investment costs. Then, we explore how the sorting of a compatible set of players by their risk attitudes into competing groups affects aggregate investment. With linear costs, a balanced sorting (i.e., minimizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups) always produces an aggregate investment level that is at least as high as an unbalanced sorting (i.e., maximizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups). Under convex costs, however, identifying which sorting is optimal is more nuanced and depends on preference and cost parameters.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study a static self-control model in which an agent's preference, temptation ranking, and cost of self-control drive her choices among a finite set of options. We show it is without loss to assume the agent's temptation ranking is the opposite of her preference. We characterize the model by relaxing the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), and exploit WARP violations to identify the model's parameters.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：I consider two models of sponsored research - one is the model where researchers get funded until (if ever) a research project experiences the first failure (bad news model), the other one is the model where the winner (if any) of a research race is rewarded (good news model). In either case, the researchers start working on a project of unknown quality. The quality of the project is identified with its ability to generate failures or successes, in the first and second models, respectively. The rate of arrival of success conditioned on the quality of the project is an increasing function of the total time spent on research. I find equilibria in both models and show that in case of two competing researchers, one of the researchers experiments inefficiently long, in the bad news model or in the good news model when either the winner takes all, or the laggard is punished. In the good news model where the laggard is rewarded, the equilibrium outcome is efficient.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：This paper seeks to explain why annuity purchases are postponed to a later age. We consider an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetime and two types of annuities. It is shown that, if the economy is dynamically inefficient, individuals demand annuities without delay. However, if it is efficient, annuity purchases are postponed. We also show that these results are robust to several extensions. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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