首页|The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
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NSTL
Elsevier
The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions - CSP scfs, for short - whose range is a subset of cardinality two of an arbitrary set A of alternatives. The study is conducted in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference among elements of A, and the domain of the scfs consists of preference profiles P = (Pv)v & ISIN;V over a society V of arbitrary cardinality. A representation formula for the two-valued CSP scfs is obtained that provides the structure of such functions.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Social choice functionsStrategy-proofnessCoalitionsIndifference
Basile, Achille、Rao, Surekha、Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara
NSTL
Elsevier
