查看更多>>摘要：This paper compares two procedures for allocating a sequence of fixed prizes in multistage nested Tullock contests. In a winner-leave (loser-leave) procedure, in each stage, the prizes of the stage are allocated to winners (losers) according to their ranks, and prizes in early stages are higher (lower) than those in later stages. Players who obtain prizes leave the contest and the others proceed to the next stage of competition. For both procedures, it is effort-maximizing to allocate one prize in each stage. Provided that the positive prizes in the sequence are homogeneous, the optimally designed loser-leave procedure generates higher total effort if and only if the number of positive prizes is lower than a threshold. If the positive prizes in the sequence are heterogeneous, then the loser-leave procedure may generate higher total effort, even if the number of positive prizes in the sequence is in the high range.
查看更多>>摘要：In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted. (C) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider a school choice problem under general priorities with ties. Priorities in practice are usually complex since a school may rank students equally or care about an affirmative action policy. Thus, we do not specify a class of priorities already known, but abstractly treat all priorities such that a stable matching exists for all students' preference profiles. For those priorities, it is unknown whether stable matchings are achievable when students are strategic. We show that a stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibria. Then, we focus on the Pareto-frontier of stable matchings, which we call constrained efficient stable. We show that, under a reasonable class of priorities, a constrained efficient stable correspondence is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition on priorities under which a constrained efficient stable correspondence is Nash implementable. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study a common-value voting model, in which private signal is typically informative but may be unreliable. Reliability determines the precision and the meaning of voters' private signals. These private signals are negatively correlated between different reliabilities. Each voter also receives noisy signals about reliability itself. When the population is sufficiently large, a bad equilibrium exists, in which all voters ignore reliability signals. It is thus possible that, at equilibrium, the majority rule makes an incorrect decision with a probability close to one. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：The impossibility of agreeing to disagree in the non-probabilistic setup means that agents cannot commonly know their decisions unless they are all the same. We study the relation of this property to the sure thing principle when it is expressed in epistemic terms. We show that it can be presented in two equivalent ways: one is in terms of knowledge operators, which we call the principle of follow the knowledgeable, the other is in terms of kens-bodies of agents' knowledge-which we call independence of irrelevant knowledge. The latter can be easily extended to a property which is equivalent to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree.
查看更多>>摘要：We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tuition fees. However, the total requested tuition fees must be equal to the total payment burden on students. We introduce two mechanism classes - the first is efficient, and the second is stable and constrained efficient. Because of general incompatibilities, neither of them is strategy-proof. Next, under certain suppositions, we introduce a mechanism that is stable, strategy-proof, and Pareto dominates the deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is the best stable rule in the absence of tuition transfers. Lastly, we provide a welfare analysis to see how colleges are affected by tuition transfers.
查看更多>>摘要：This paper studies competitive bundling in an oligopoly market with one multi-product dominant firm and several symmetric small firms. In the model of (competing against) specialists each small firm produces a single product, while in the model of (competing against) generalists each small firm produces multiple products. In the model of specialists, we show that the dominant firm will bundle if and only if its dominance level is relatively high. In the model of generalists, the dominant firm's incentive to bundle is stronger than small firms'. In particular, we find that (i) when the dominance level is low enough (and the number of firms is not too large), bundling hurts all firms and no firm bundles; (ii) when the dominance level is relatively high, the dominant firm bundles while small firms sell separately. We also study the impacts of bundling on welfare and derive implications for anti-trust policies. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider classes of games for a fixed set of players with fixed strategy sets. For such classes, we analyze and develop the concept of invariance, which is satisfied when the set of Nash equilibria and corresponding equilibrium payoffs are identical for each payoff function within the class. We introduce the condition superior payoff matching, which requires that at any given strategy profile, each player can match her highest payoff near that strategy profile across all games within that class. If a specific game satisfies superior payoff matching, then its equilibria are invariant within a class of games with smaller sets of discontinuities. This condition can be used to prove existence of Nash equilibrium in games that are not quasiconcave or better reply secure. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
查看更多>>摘要：We propose a new solution for coalition bargaining problems among n players that can form coalitions c generating heterogenous coalitional values S-c is an element of R. The players' values v(i) and probability of coalition formation mu(c) are given by: V-i = Sigma(C subset of W) (delta V-i + gamma) I (i is an element of C)mu(C) and Sigma(C subset of W) mu(C) = 1, where coalition c is chosen only if it maximizes the average gain gamma(C) = 1/vertical bar C vertical bar (S-C - delta Sigma(j is an element of C) V-j) and gamma (math) max(C is an element of W) gamma(c). This solution is the strong Markov perfect equilibrium of a noncooperative coalition bargaining game where players choose simultaneously the coalition they want to join followed by negotiations to split the surplus. The solution does not rely on the specification of a proposer recognition protocol. For majority voting games, the solution exhibits more inequality among the values of large and small parties and a concentrated equilibrium coalition formation distribution. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik (1971) characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game is always non-empty, that of the general graph matching game can be empty. This paper salvages the situation by giving an imputation in the 2/3-approximate core for the latter; moreover this imputation can be computed in polynomial time. This bound is best possible, since it is the integrality gap of the natural underlying LP. Our profit allocation method goes further: the multiplier on the profit of an agent is often better than 2/3 and lies in the interval [2/3,1], depending on how severely constrained the agent is. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
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