首页|The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle
The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle
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NSTL
Elsevier
The impossibility of agreeing to disagree in the non-probabilistic setup means that agents cannot commonly know their decisions unless they are all the same. We study the relation of this property to the sure thing principle when it is expressed in epistemic terms. We show that it can be presented in two equivalent ways: one is in terms of knowledge operators, which we call the principle of follow the knowledgeable, the other is in terms of kens-bodies of agents' knowledge-which we call independence of irrelevant knowledge. The latter can be easily extended to a property which is equivalent to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree.
Sure thing principleAgreeing to disagreeCommon knowledge
NSTL
Elsevier
