查看更多>>摘要：This paper studies a multi-player lottery contest in which heterogeneous contestants exhibit reference-dependent loss aversion a la Ko?szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We verify the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy choice-acclimating personal Nash equilibrium (CPNE) under moderate loss aversion and fully characterize the equilibrium. The equilibrium sharply contrasts with that in the two-player risk-neutral symmetric case. Loss aversion can lead contestants' individual efforts to change nonmonotonically, while the total effort strictly decreases. Further, it always leads to a more elitist distributional outcome, in the sense that a smaller set of contestants remain active in the competition and stronger contestants' equilibrium winning probabilities increase. We demonstrate that loss aversion generates a fundamentally different decision problem than risk aversion and develop a rationale that explains the contrasting predictions from the two frameworks. Finally, our results are robust under the alternative equilibrium concept of preferred personal Nash equilibrium (PPNE). (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning increases strategic behavior, but also reduces envy. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study the long run convention emerging from stag hunt interactions when agents occasionally revise their action over time adopting a perturbed myopic best response rule, with the novelty of introducing social competition in the form of assignment of prizes to agents depending on the payoff ranking resulting from the stag hunt interaction. We find that social competition plays a crucial and articulated role in the selection of the long run convention: indeed, a high enough reward from competition selects the payoff-dominant convention when competition is harsh, and the maximin convention when competition is mild.(C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We explore risk preference elicitation when subjects choose directly from an exogenously specified set of lotteries. Our choice tasks differ incrementally, e.g., from choosing between two lotteries to selecting a portfolio from a continuous set of bundled Arrow securities, and from text to spatial presentation. Each subject completes multiple instances of five different tasks, and responses for each task are summarized in parametric (CRRA) and non-parametric (normalized risk premium) measures of risk preference. Variation in task attributes explains much of the observed wide variation in elicited preferences and in correlations across task pairs. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider a model where the same group of players is involved in more than one cooperative (transferable utility) game. A rule determines the payoffs per game, and for each player a utility function evaluates the resulting vector of payoffs. We assume that each player, independently, can make transfers of worth between different games, thereby affecting its payoff vector and, thus, utility. Two transfer systems are considered, resulting in two distinct noncooperative games, and the focus of the paper is on establishing existence and a characterization of Nash equilibria in these games. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：This paper explores multi-stage incomplete information games with common ambiguous information about states or types and ambiguity averse players. We characterize a belief formation process that allows players to take their knowledge about the structure of the game into account. This process leads to subjective rectangular ex-ante belief sets for all players. We show that given these sets of beliefs, players behave dynamically consistent. Therefore, using our belief formation process, we can extend the concept of sequential equilibria to multi-stage ambiguous incomplete information games. Furthermore, we characterize assumption under which sequential rationality implies rectangularity. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Central to this note is the concept of disjointly productive players. Two players are disjointly productive if there is no synergy effect if one of these players joins a coalition containing the other. Our first new axiom states that the payoff to a player does not change when another player, disjointly productive in relation to that player, leaves the game. The second new axiom implies that if a player splits into two disjointly productive players who together contribute the same to the game as the original player, the payoff to another player does not change. These two axioms, along with efficiency, characterize the Shapley value. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider matching-mechanism design in an environment in which agents acquire information about their preferences endogenously. Information is costly; thus, agents acquire information only if it is relevant to their decision-making. Agents' beliefs about their choice set (i.e., the set of objects each agent can obtain) are therefore crucial for incentives in information acquisition. This study demonstrates that the implementation of matching mechanisms changes the equilibrium consequence because it influences agents' beliefs about choice sets. We analyze the behavior of the random serial dictatorship mechanism in a stylized environment. We construct a family of economies in which agents have independent and private values but information disclosure about choice sets leads to inefficient outcome. We induce more efficient information acquisition through information design. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider a Prisoner's Dilemma model with a pre-play communication stage. Players get a disutility from deceiving others after sending a message of conditional cooperation. Each player's realized lying aversion cost is private information. We prove existence and characterize the (unique) symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium that maximizes cooperation. In this distinguished equilibrium, the frequency of cooperation decreases as material gains from lying (or losses from being deceived) increase. We introduce an iterated procedure allowing to characterize the set of rationalizable strategies. We find that cooperation may decrease as a population starts to value honesty more. We extend the model to account for the possibility of a benefit obtained when lying or the effect of the audience size. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Let V be a society whose members express weak preferences about two alternatives. We show simple representation formulae that are valid for all, and only, the elements of various classes of non-manipulable social choice functions on V. We represent the entire class of the non-manipulable social choice functions, and various of its subclasses corresponding to further properties. We focus mainly on anonymity. Efficiency and neutrality up to one voter are also considered. As a consequence of the representation formulae, the cardinalities of some of these classes are also established. Notably, we show that the number of anonymous and non-manipulable social choice functions on V is 2(n+1) if V contains n members. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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