首页|Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
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NSTL
Elsevier
This paper explores multi-stage incomplete information games with common ambiguous information about states or types and ambiguity averse players. We characterize a belief formation process that allows players to take their knowledge about the structure of the game into account. This process leads to subjective rectangular ex-ante belief sets for all players. We show that given these sets of beliefs, players behave dynamically consistent. Therefore, using our belief formation process, we can extend the concept of sequential equilibria to multi-stage ambiguous incomplete information games. Furthermore, we characterize assumption under which sequential rationality implies rectangularity. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
NSTL
Elsevier
