Adopting the analysis method from evolutionary game theory,this study investigates the risk governance of rural cooperative inclusive finance in China.The results show that borrowing individuals do not always choose the"compliance"strategy in the game process with cooperative inclusive finance organizations.In the modern rural society characterized by greater population mobility and accelerating marketization,the probability of borrowing individuals choosing"default"increases.In the evolutionary game process between cooperative inclusive finance organizations and their regulators,the evolutionary stability strategy of active regulation and standardized operation is only an ideal state.The irregular operation of cooperative inclusive finance organizations and the inertia of regulators constitute major sources of risk for cooperative inclusive finance.Therefore,it is imperative to establish a"three-in-one"risk governance system for rural cooperative inclusive finance encompassing"borrowing individuals—cooperative inclusive finance organizations—regulatory bodies."By constructing a long-term mechanism for stable"compliance"of individual borrowers,strengthening the internal recognition of"standardized operation"of cooperative inclusive finance organizations,and innovating the development of cooperative inclusive finance through active regulation,we can jointly promote the healthy development of rural cooperative inclusive finance.
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