不同兼业程度下政策性农业保险的静态博弈分析——以江苏省为例
Static Game Analysis of Policy-oriented Agricultural Insurance under Different Degree of Part-time Farmers——Taking Jiangsu Province as an Example
马宇贝 1朱海星1
作者信息
- 1. 南京林业大学经济管理学院,江苏南京 210037
- 折叠
摘要
从农户兼业化的角度出发,以江苏省的"联办共保"模式为例,对政策性农业保险中农户、政府以及保险公司的利益博弈关系进行了分析,探讨了兼业化对政策性农业保险的影响.结果表明:随着兼业化的程度不断加深,农户对政策性农业保险的需求将会降低,在兼业化程度较高的情况下要实现有效合作,必须依靠政府的激励.
Abstract
From the perspective of part-timing of farmers, taking the model of "joint co-insurance" in Jiangsu Province as an example, we analyzed the interests and interests of farmers, governments and insurance companies in policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and explored the impact of part-timing of farmers on policy agriculture insurance.The results showed that with the increasing degree of concurrent industry, farmers' demand for policy-oriented agricultural insurance would be reduced, and the effective cooperation should be supported by the government in the case of higher degree of part-time farmers.
关键词
政策性农业保险/兼业化/博弈分析Key words
Policy-oriented agricultural insurance/Part-timing/Game analysis引用本文复制引用
基金项目
2015年大学生实践创新训练计划项目(201510298006Z)
出版年
2017
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
维普
万方数据