Under the carbon tax policy,it is assumed that consumer demand is jointly influenced by the carbon emis-sion reduction levels of upstream and downstream enterprises and the efforts of low-carbon promotion.Two Stackel-berg differential game models are constructed for the long-term joint emission reduction and low-carbon promotion of manufacturers and retailers before and after cost sharing,taking into account the dynamic changes of product carbon emission reduction influenced by the reduction efforts of upstream manufacturers'emission.The results show that,compared with no carbon tax,the implementation of the carbon tax policy can improve the carbon emission reduction of products and retailers'profits in the long run,but it will reduce manufacturers'profits;in addition,when certain conditions are met regarding the carbon tax and the marginal profits of upstream and downstream enterprises,the cost-sharing contract can further improve the carbon emission reduction of products,achieve the Pareto improvement in profits of upstream and downstream enterprises,and broaden the elasticity space of the carbon tax.
关键词
碳税/碳减排/低碳宣传/成本分担契约/微分博弈
Key words
carbon tax/carbon emission reduction/low-carbon promotion/cost sharing contract/differential game
万方数据