A Research on the Optimization of Pension Structure Based on Income Heterogeneity among Policyholders
To address the challenges posed by an aging population on the existing pay-as-you-go(PAYGO)pension system,Chi-na has actively promoted individual pension schemes.The tax incentive policy has been instrumental in optimizing individual pen-sion returns and broadening its coverage.Diverse tax rates applicable to different income groups determine the level of tax benefits individuals receive when participating in individual pension plans,leading to varied preferences and pension return efficiencies.This paper incorporates income heterogeneity among policyholders into a theoretical model,establishing Stackelberg equilibriums between distinct income groups and the government.Within this framework,we calculate optimal contribution ratios for the PAY-GO pension,EET pension,and individual savings.In the benchmark model,high-income groups are inclined to maximize contribu-tions to the EET pension,while middle and low-income groups opt for partial contributions.Additionally,results for the optimal PAYGO contribution rate and EET contribution limit exhibit a better-calibrated effect compared to current pension practices.The study highlights that expanding the middle-income group contributes to overall social welfare.Increasing the return rate facilitates the expansion of individual pension coverage.Furthermore,optimizing tax incentives for individual pensions involves both"raising the contribution limit"and"lowering the tax rate receiving the benefit."These adjustments can be implemented without escala-ting the government's fiscal burden,thereby enhancing the efficiency of tax incentive policies.
income heterogeneitytax incentivesindividual pensionsStackelberg Equilibriumfiscal utility