Strategic Interactive Behaviors of Basic Pension Premium Collection in China
As the main source of income for retirees,the social basic pension program is the financial foundation of and important guarantee for realizing the good life of"adequate elderly provision".This paper explores the differentiated strategic interactive be-haviors of local governments in basic pension premium collection based on the Two-regime Spatial Durbin Model.The results of the empirical study arrives at the following findings.Firstly,as the pressure on the basic pension program's income and expendi-ture increases,the local governments'premium collection rate shows an inverted U-shaped trend and is influenced by soft and hard budget constraints.Secondly,the strategic interactive behaviors of local governments on the premium collection exist between geographically and economically adjacent regions;the strategic interactive behavior between geographically adjacent regions is mainly characterized by"imitative behaviors",versus"topping competition"between economically adjacent regions.Thirdly,the strategic interactive behavior varies significantly across time and regions.Finally,as the pressure on pension income and expendi-ture increases,the strategic interaction of local governments on premium collection increases.
basic pension programstrategic interactionsoft budget constraintTwo-regime Spatial Durbin Model