Research on collaborative development between new agricultural management entities and small farmers based on evolutionary game models
To comprehensively promote rural revitalization and accelerate the construction of an agricultural powerhouse,it is essential to balance the cultivation of new types of agricultural operators with support for small farmers.Effective pathways to foster the collaborative development between new agricultural operators and small farmers include government incentives,leadership from new agricultural operators,and participation from small farmers.By constructing an evolutionary game model among the"government-new agricultural operators-small farmers"triadic game entities,this study reveals the impact mechanism of key decision variables such as government incentive policies,the driving costs of new agricultural operators,and the benefits of small farmers on the path of collaborative evolution.The findings indicate that:Firstly,when the government provides passive incentives,the fixed regulatory costs are higher than when it actively incentivizes.In the case where new agricultural operators and small farmers are willing to cooperate unilaterally,government subsidies cannot compensate for the additional costs incurred by both parties,leading the system to tend towards an equilibrium state where the government actively incentivizes,new agricultural operators do not lead,and small farmers do not participate;Secondly,when the government actively incentivizes,the sum of subsidies and regulatory costs for both parties is less than the fixed regulatory costs when the government is passively incentivizing.Both new agricultural operators and small farmers can realize value addition when engaging in coordinated development,leading the system to tend towards an equilibrium state where the government actively incentivizes,new agricultural operators lead,and small farmers participate.Numerical simulations suggest that the difference in fixed regulatory costs under different incentive policies of the government,the driving costs of new agricultural operators,and the standardized production costs of small farmers,these three key parameters significantly influence the optimal strategy choices of each entity.Therefore,with active government incentives,effectively controlling the important cost parameters of game subjects can achieve the coordinated development of new agricultural operators and small farmers.
new agricultural operatorssmall farmerscoordinated developmentevolutionary gameincentive policy
国家科技期刊平台
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