Reputation loss,liquidated penalties and low-carbon innovation network governance among manufacturing enterprises:Based on an evolutionary game model
Aiming at the complex problems faced by enterprises to carry out low-carbon innovation cooperation,this paper takes the low-carbon innovation network of manufacturing enterprise cooperation as the empirical analysis object,and comprehensively uses the network evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation tools based on bounded rationality to analyze the law of the evolution of the behavior of the cooperative subject under the action of the reputation loss mechanism and the fine mechanism.The research shows that the reputation loss mechanism in the low-carbon innovation network positively affects the behavior of manufacturing enterprises,which is conducive to maintaining cooperation,and with the increase of reputation loss,the betrayal behavior in the low-carbon innovation network decreases.Under the premise of the failure of the reputation loss mechanism,it is found that a moderate increase in the penalty for breach of contract can strengthen the cooperation of innovative entities,but when the penalty for breach of contract exceeds a certain threshold,it is not conducive to the establishment and maintenance of the cooperative relationship between the two parties.In order to maintain the stability of low-carbon innovation network,it is necessary to strengthen the importance of enterprise reputation and improve the information disclosure system,to set a moderate default penalty to raise the cost of default,to make multiple governance mechanisms work in concert to improve the governance system.
low-carbon innovation network governancepenalty for breach of contractreputation lossevolutionary game
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