Dual Objectives of SOEs and Improving the Allocation Efficiency of Internal Capital Market
Improving the efficiency of capital allocation is an important focus of the new round of deepening the reform of SOEs.The characteristics of property rights and functional positioning of SOEs lead to the particularity of their ICM formation and operation.Based on the economic and non-economic objectives of SOEs,this paper constructs a cost-benefit trade-off model of information rent incentive,and attempts to place the target change and governance improvement in the same analytical framework,which provides evidence for the practice of classified and mixed reform of SOEs.This research finds that,firstly ICMs with higher information transparency can effectively enhance group value in the presence of budget constraints;secondly a non-negative information rent paid by headquarters to division managers can improve internal capital allocation efficiency;thirdly with the increase of the weight of economic objectives,the information rent incentive to be paid by the headquarters and its benefits will increase.Therefore,the government should actively promote the mixed ownership reform of classified SOEs and introduce a larger proportion of high-quality non-state-owned capital;it should provide different levels of incentives to branch managers according to their risk attitudes and create a good corporate culture to improve information transparency;and it should implement a"nucleation"strategy for overly diversified SOE groups.
Dual objectives of state-owned enterprisesinternal capital marketallocation efficiencyinformation rentmixed-ownership reform