RECONSTRUCTING THE INTEREST GAME MECHANISM OF URBAN RENEWAL:A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF "LAND DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS GAP"
The incremental interest generated by the distribution of land development rights(LDR)is the core of the complex interest game among the government,society,and market in urban renewal.In the process of distributing LDR,there exists a significant gap between the"nominal LDR"conferred by policies and the"actual LDR"approved by the government.This paper defines the"gap between the nominal and the actual"as"land development rights gap(LDRG)",and puts forward three control powers(rights)that affect the distribution of LDR in urban renewal from the perspective of control theory:policy-making power,gaming and voting right,and supervision and approval power.Taking the renewal of Hubei Area in Shenzhen as an example,this paper discusses the process of multiple subjects using the three control powers(rights)to compete for the LDRG.It is found that the competition for LDRG is the core to the interest game of urban renewal.The size of LDRG,along with the exercise of control power(right),presents an evolutionary feature of"inhibition,release,expansion,and closure",which can be used to characterize the complexity and intensity of the interest game.The game of LDRG provides a new perspective for policy optimization and spatial governance capacity enhancement in urban renewal.
urban renewalinterest gameland development rights gap(LDRG)control power(right)Shenzhen
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