首页|控股股东股权质押与尾部系统风险——基于"支持"和"侵害"的竞争性动机视角

控股股东股权质押与尾部系统风险——基于"支持"和"侵害"的竞争性动机视角

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本文从"支持"和"侵害"企业的竞争性动机出发,探究了控股股东股权质押对企业尾部系统风险的影响.研究发现:控股股东股权质押水平与企业尾部系统风险呈U型关系.当质押水平低于临界值时,质押能有效缓解企业的尾部系统风险;当质押水平高于临界值时,质押将提高企业的尾部系统风险.融资约束和经营业绩是控股股东股权质押影响企业尾部系统风险的两条路径,两者随质押水平上升分别呈现U型和倒U型.质押水平与尾部系统风险的U型关系在国有企业、控股股东持股比例较高和股票流动性较低的企业中更为明显.
Pledge of Controlling Shareholders' Equity and Systematic Tail Risk——From the Perspective of Competitive Motivations of"Supporting"and"Infringing"
This paper explores the impact of controlling shareholders'equity pledge on the systematic tail risk of enter-prises from the perspective of competitive motivations of"supporting"and"infringing"enterprises.Research has found that there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of equity pledge by controlling shareholders and the systematic tail risk of enterprises.When the pledge level is below the critical value,the pledge can effectively alleviate the systematic tail risk of the enterprise.When the pledge level exceeds the critical value,the pledge will increase the systematic tail risk of the enterprise.Financing constraints and operating performance are the two paths through which controlling shareholders'equity pledge affects the systematic tail risk of the enterprise,and the financing constraints and operating performance show U-shaped and inverted U-shaped relationship respectively with the pledge level.The U-shaped relationship between pledge level and systematic tail risk is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises,enterprises with higher shareholding ratios of controlling shareholders,and enterprises with lower stock liquidity.

controlling shareholderequity pledge levelsystematic tail riskcompetitive motivation

李政、李纪欣

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天津财经大学金融学院(天津,300222)

控股股东 股权质押水平 尾部系统风险 竞争性动机

国家社科基金重大项目

23ZDA038

2024

金融论坛
城市金融研究所 中国城市金融学会

金融论坛

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.83
ISSN:1009-9190
年,卷(期):2024.29(2)
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