Executive Equity Incentives,Managerial Myopia and Enterprise Financialization
In recent years,alongside China's rapid economic growth,there has been a shift from the real economy to the virtual economy.Increasingly,real sector enterprises are diverting from their traditional core businesses and investing substantial funds into financial markets.This shift has led to a growing scale of financial asset allocation and an increasing dependence of real sector enterprises on financial investment returns,resulting in a more severe phenomenon of enterprise financialization.As key decision-makers in enterprise production and operation,executives significantly influence the allocation of financial assets within firms.This study uses data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2020 to empirically analyze the impact mechanism of executive equity incentives on enterprise financialization.The findings suggest that executive equity incentives can effectively inhibit enterprise financialization,with managerial myopia playing a partial mediating role between the two.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the inhibitory effect of executive equity incentives on enterprise financialization is more pronounced in companies with high financing constraints and among executives without a financial education background.Therefore,companies should optimize their executive equity incentive systems,continually enhance the profitability of their core businesses,and value the financial education background of executives.Additionally,the government should improve the financing environment through various policy measures to help reduce enterprise financing costs.
万方数据
维普
