首页|大国竞争、昂贵信号与小国对外政策选择——以中美竞争中的菲律宾、新加坡为例

大国竞争、昂贵信号与小国对外政策选择——以中美竞争中的菲律宾、新加坡为例

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竞争中的大国不仅试图维持实力上的相对优势,还要寻求更高的地位,从而确立自身的国际影响力.鉴于地位的社会性,即使大国拥有雄厚的实力,其地位也需要小国的认可.为了争取小国的地位支持,大国会积极运用自身实力向小国提供合作产品.借用"昂贵信号"理论可以探究中美在不同时期对菲律宾和新加坡两国的政策影响.如果体系内存在两个实力相近且互为竞争关系的大国,同时都具有向小国提供安全和经济产品的能力与意愿,处于该环境下的小国会依照两个大国释放信号的成本来判断其承诺的可信度,从而采取不同的政策立场来表达对大国地位的支持或质疑.当两个大国均释放出带有较高成本的信号时,小国倾向于采取对冲立场(对大国的地位表达模糊态度);当大国发出的信号在成本上存在明显差异时,小国会倾向于支持信号成本较高的一方大国.本文通过选取2009年前后和2017年前后两个时段菲律宾的外交立场调整,以及2017年前后新加坡的立场调整对以上假说进行检验.
Great Power Competition,Costly Signaling,and Foreign Policy Choices of Small States:The Case of Philippines and Singapore in Sino-US Competition
Competing major powers not only try to maintain their relative power positions but also seek higher status to establish their international influence.Given the social character of status,even if a great power has great strength,its status needs the recognition of small countries.In order to win the status support of small countries,great powers will actively use their own strength to provide cooperative goods to small countries.This article uses the theory of"costly signaling"to explore the policy impacts of China and the United States on the Philippines and Singapore at different times.This article hypothesizes that if there are two great powers in the international system that are comparable in strength,competing with each other,and they are both able and willing to provide security and economic goods to small states,the small states will base their policy on the perceived costs of the signals sent by the two great powers.Small states,in turn,will assess the credibility of great powers'commitments and adopt different policy stances to express support or doubt for powerful states'status as great power.When two great powers send signals that carry high costs,small countries tend to adopt a hedging stance(expressing ambiguous attitudes towards the status of the big power);when there is a clear difference in the costs of signals sent by great powers,small states tend to support the power with higher signaling costs.This article conducts a case study of the Philippines and Singapore to test the hypotheses proposed above.

Great Power CompetitionSignaling CostsCredibility of CommitmentsPhilippinesSingapore

王梓元、匡泽玮

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外交学院国际关系研究所(北京 100037)

大国竞争 信号成本 承诺可信度 菲律宾 新加坡

国家社会科学基金重点项目

22AZD103

2024

东北亚论坛
吉林大学

东北亚论坛

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.879
ISSN:1003-7411
年,卷(期):2024.33(1)
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