Controlling Shareholders'Stock Pledge and M&A Behaviors
With the normalization of equity pledge behavior by controlling share-holders,whether enterprises will adopt merger and acquisition decisions in the con-text of controlling shareholder equity pledge has become a research topic worthy of attention.Taking Chinese listed companies from 2013 to 2022 as samples and uses a moderated mediation model to empirically analyze the impact and mechanism of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate merger and acquisition behavior.Research has found that companies with equity pledge from controlling shareholde-rs are more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions compared to companies without equity pledge from controlling shareholders.The higher the level of pledge,the stronger the company's willingness to engage in mergers and acquisi-tions.The pledge of controlling shareholder equity can promote the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions by enhancing the incentive level of management equity,and digital transformation has a negative regulatory effect on the second half of its intermediary effect.Based on empirical analysis results,provide relevant sugges-tions for corporate and capital market governance decisions,firstly,strictly regu-late the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders and strengthen internal governance of enterprises.Secondly,improve the equity incentive system to pro-mote digital transformation of enterprises.Thirdly,strengthen investor risk as-sessment capabilities and optimize investor structure.
万方数据
维普
