Pressure Response,Interest Conflicts and the"Attention-Grabbing"Logic of International Institutional Creation
Why do states create weak international institutions that are insufficient to achieve their intended goals?As existing theories of institutional creation cannot explain this phenomenon,this paper proposes the"attention-grabbing"logic of institutional creation to fill this gap.When faced with normative pressure that conflicts with the interests of major domestic interest groups,states can create weak institutions to divert the attention of international and domestic audiences,making them believe that their demands are being addressed.This allows the state to alleviate short-term normative pressure without compromising its own interests and at a relatively low cost.This article validates this theory through two cases:Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate(APP)led by the U.S.in 2005,and the Kyoto Protocol led by the EU.The study finds that in comparison with the EU's relationship with the Kyoto Protocol,the US created the Asia-Pacific Partnership not to advance global climate governance but to mitigate increasing domestic normative pressure.This logic not only enriches existing theories of institutional creation but also provides a reflection on the deep-seated reasons behind the inefficiency and death of current international institutions.
Weak International InstitutionsInstitution BuildingNormative PressureClimate ChangeGlobal Governance
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