Heterogeneous Capital Ownership,Internal and External Governance and the Risk of Share Price Collapse of State-Owned Enterprises
Preventing systemic financial risks is an important guarantee for healthy economic development.Based on the correlation between stock price crash risk and systemic financial risk,we empirically test the im-pact of non-state capital participation of different nature on stock price crash risk of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)using a sample of SOEs from 2014 to 2020,and further examine the moderating effect of internal and exter-nal corporate governance on the relationship between non-state capital participation and stock price crash risk of SOEs.The results show that private capital participation reduces the risk of stock price crash risk,and institutional investors'participation increases the risk of stock price crash risk while no significant effect of foreign capital participation is ob-served.The results still hold after a series of robustness tests.In terms of internal and external governance,the level of internal governance has a significant positive moderating effect on the relationship between private capital ownership and stock price crash risk,and the external governance environment has a significant negative moderating effect on the rela-tionship between institutional investor ownership and stock price crash risk.
Systemic financial riskShare price collapseState—owned enterprisesCapital of heterogeneous na-tureGovernance context
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维普
