A Strategic Study of Board of Directors'Supervision of Managerial Behavior in the Context of New Quality Productive Forces——Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Model
Aiming at addressing the issue of information asymmetry between owners and operators in corporate governance under the context of developing new-quality productivity,this study establishes a game model between board supervision and managers' misconduct based on the principal-agent theory and evolutionary game methodology.By observing the changes in managers' strategic choices,the study seeks to identify the factors influencing their decision-making.The results indicate that the severity of punishment imposed by the board on managers' misconduct is crucial.When the punishment is too lenient,managers may resort to misconduct to pursue personal interests.Furthermore,the importance of rewarding positive behavior among managers cannot be understated.Inadequate incentives may prompt managers to turn to misconduct;however,even in the case of dissatisfaction with rewards,the existence of a punishment mechanism deters managers from easily engaging in misconduct.Additionally,the board's supervisory attitude has a long-term impact on managers' strategic choices.If the board indulges in managers' behavior for an extended period,managers may become more daring in choosing misconduct.Therefore,the board should establish scientific and reasonable incentive and constraint mechanisms to ensure the alignment of managers' behavior with company interests,thereby more effectively curbing misconduct and promoting high-quality corporate governance and development.
board of directorsmanagersnew quality productive forcesprincipal-agentcorporate governanceevolutionary game theory
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