Strategic Irrationality or Else:An Alliance Theory Analysis of NATO's Asia-Pacificisation in the Context of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
As the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues,the"concomitance"between this crisis and NATO's Asia-Pacificization has become more and more obvious,i.e.,with the escalation and continuation of the conflict,the depth and speed of NATO's Asia-Pacificization have increased.This"concomitance"raises a salient theoretical question:why would NATO risk a deterioration in relations with China by expanding its alliance commitments in the Asia-Pacific region at the very beginning of a large-scale conflict with Russia?This phenomenon is particularly"counterintuitive"given that the risks of such"strategic fragmentation"are recognized by many policymakers in NATO's membership,and that there is no shortage of"differentiation"advocates among international relations theorists in their countries.Most existing studies have observed this phenomenon to varying degrees,but the analysis tends to treat it as strategically irrational behavior and seldom uses alliance theory to analyze the impact of the crisis on the calculus of gains and losses of the parties involved.Based on a fuller understanding of the concept of alliance costs,this paper comprehensively discusses the changes in the gains and losses of the United States and its allies over NATO's Asia-Pacificization before and after the Ukrainian crisis,and argues that the outbreak of the crisis has reduced the marginal losses that U.S.allies might have incurred to the U.S.in terms of policy cooperation with China and Russia,and also reduced the potential gains from their"differentiated treatment"of China and Russia.It also reduces the potential gains from their"differentiated treatment"of China and Russia.These important developments have increased the policy attractiveness of engaging in and promoting NATO's Asia-Pacificization,which has accelerated significantly in the in the wake of the crisis.The crisis has helped the U.S.to partially overcome the inherent tensions in its own alliance policy,realizing its goal of demanding more security resources from its European allies while trying to limit their strategic autonomy.More importantly,the"unintended"result of the crisis in strengthening the alliance may prompt the U.S.to adjust its alliance policy and consciously adopt a strategy of"combine and manage"with China and Russia,which is particularly important for us to be vigilant about.