The domestic politics of the United States have a significant impact on its diplomatic behavior with in-ternational organizations.Historically,although the U.S.has gained substantial benefits and global influence through the creation and maintenance of international organizations,it has also opted to withdraw from some due to conflicts between the organizations'policy objectives and American interests.This article argues that there are numerous interest groups with different preferences for international institutions within American domestic politics,and these interest groups continu-ously influence the long-term dialogue and bargaining negotia-tions between the U.S.government and international organiza-tions.The paper argues that the preferences of interest groups and their influence on policymakers,combined with the re-sponsiveness of international organizations to U.S.reform de-mands,jointly shape the outcomes of withdrawal decisions.Through empirical studies of the U.S.withdrawals from the International Labour Organization(ILO)and the United Na-tions Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO),the paper reveals a two-stage influence of interest groups on national preferences:initially,groups with reservations about international institutions lobby for renegoti-ations with international organizations to align policy goals more closely with U.S.interests.Subsequently,the outcomes of these negotiations in turn affect the power dynamics among various interest groups.If the U.S.applies pressure on interna-tional organizations through measures such as refusing to pay dues and fails to achieve success,the bargaining power of groups with weaker institutional preferences is relatively en-hanced,ultimately leading to the U.S.withdrawing from the organization.
United StatesInterest GroupsWith-drawal BargainingILOUNESCO
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NSTL
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