基于演化博弈的预约停车策略分析
Analysis of reservation parking strategy based on evolutionary game theory
卢桐百 1高良鹏 1胡永仕 1简文良 1曾丽华1
作者信息
- 1. 福建理工大学 交通运输学院,福建 福州 350118
- 折叠
摘要
针对停车供需矛盾失衡、预约停车模式发展缓慢等问题,应用演化博弈理论探究预约停车模式中驾驶人、停车平台和管理部门之间的互动关系,建立了三方演化博弈模型,解析停车行为中各参与方决策行为的演化稳定性,模拟不同收益水平对各方演化博弈行为的影响.研究结果表明,驾驶人、停车平台和管理部门的决策行为演化速率和演化波动性受各自收益制约并产生相互影响;其中,管理部门所采取的激励策略对预约停车发展起明显的促进作用,而停车平台对管理部门激励力度的响应程度会高于驾驶人群体;当停车平台能够提供较为稳定的停车预约服务时,管理部门可逐渐实行激励退坡,而较不会影响到驾驶人能享受的预约停车便利性.
Abstract
In response to the imbalance between parking supply and demand and the slow development of the reservation parking mode,the evolutionary game theory was applied to explore the interaction between drivers,parking platforms,and management departments in the reservation parking mode.A tripartite evolutionary game model was established to analyze the evolutionary stability of the decision-making behavior among all par-ties involved in parking behavior,and to simulate the impact of different income levels on the evolutionary game behavior of all parties involved.Research results indicate that the evolution rate and volatility of decision-making behaviors of drivers,parking platforms,and management departments are constrained by their respec-tive benefits and interact with one another.Among them,the incentive strategies adopted by the management department have a significant promoting effect on the development of reserved parking,and the response of parking platforms to the incentive efforts of the management department will be higher than that of the driver group.When the parking platform can provide a relatively stable parking reservation service,the management department can gradually implement incentives to retreat without affecting the convenience of reservation park-ing that drivers can enjoy.
关键词
演化博弈/预约停车/政策激励/停车模式Key words
evolutionary game/reservation parking/policy incentives/parking mode引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据