Theoretical basis and optimization strategy of government's participation in distribution of value-added income from collective-operated construction land transfer
Theoretical basis and optimization strategy of government's participation in distribution of value-added income from collective-operated construction land transfer
To stabilize the government's land income expectation is very important for government to play a promising role in deepening reform of collective-operated construction land transfer.We discussed the theoretical basis of government's participation in the distribution of value-added income in the market,used the Shapley model to examine the rationality of the actual distribution of the value-added income of local governments,and proposed an optimal allocation scheme in line with the Pareto improvement.The results show that:1)The positive external benefit generated by direct or indirect investment and the social and economic functions of governments are the reasons that local governments can participate in the distribution.2)There is heterogeneity in the distribution of actual benefits from the entry of collective-operated construction land into the market in terms of subject,purpose,and region.The upper limit of the proportion of income for local governments does not exceed 50%,but the lower limit is less than 20%,and the fluctuation range of income from various types of land for government is 10%-20%.3)The tripartite alliance of government,rural collective,and individual farmer is conducive to fairness of results and opportunities,and the value-added income is in line with the Pareto improvement strategy,and the optimized government income distribution ratio is about 30%,the fluctuation range is controlled within 3%.
关键词
集体经营性建设用地入市/增值收益分配/合作博弈/Shapley法
Key words
collective-operated construction land transfer/distribution of value-added income/coalitional game/Shapley Method
维普
万方数据