Watershed ecological compensation standard based on bargaining game analysis:taking recharging fresh water for repelling saltwater intrusion in Xijiang River as a case
In this study,a game-based watershed ecological compensation method is proposed.Taking the Xi-jiang River saltwater replacement scheduling as an example.The upper and lower limits of ecological compensa-tion are calculated by using the water resource value method that can reflect the value of saltwater replacement and the loss cost method that can reflect the power generation loss caused by water diversion in the upstream of the basin.The cost of power generation loss is accepted as the lower limit of compensation for the upstream of Xijiang River,which is 5.393 billion yuan per year on average.The value of water resources is accepted as the upper limit of compensation for the downstream,which is 183.17 billion yuan per year on average.According to the bargaining game theory,the final ecological compensation standard is 112.61 billion yuan per year.The re-search method of this paper can provide reference for the establishment of ecological compensation mechanism in cross-border basins.
watershed ecological compensationrecharging fresh water for repelling saltwater intrusiongame theoryXijiang River
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