Audit Fees,Executive Political Affiliation and Surplus Management
Based on a research sample of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shen-zhen from 2010 to 2021,the study examines the impact and mechanism of audit fees on corporate surplus management.The study finds that the higher the audit fee,the lower the degree of accrued surplus man-agement and true surplus management of listed companies;and the higher the degree of accrued surplus management and true surplus management of companies with politically connected executives compared with companies with politically connected executives.Heterogeneity analysis shows that political affil-iation of executives weakens the inhibitory effect of audit fees on true surplus management but not on accrued surplus management;compared with state-owned firms,private firms can be more significantly inhibited from accrued surplus management and true surplus management by increasing audit fees;fur-thermore,compared with non-Big Four"In addition,compared with non-Big Four accounting firms,in-ternational Big Four accounting firms have a stronger inhibiting effect on corporate surplus management behavior by charging higher audit fees.The mechanism analysis shows that audit fees mainly inhibit cor-porate surplus management by improving audit quality.The article explores the game results of external auditing and political affiliation in Chinese capital market to provide theoretical basis for optimizing the efficiency of corporate capital allocation.
万方数据
维普
