An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Debt Financing on Ultimate Shareholder Behavior——Threshold Effect and Regulation Effect Based on Internal Control Quality
In listed companies with centralized equity structures,ultimate shareholders have strong motivations to infringe on the interests of other small and medium shareholders.Debt financ-ing is an important part of corporate governance,and it is an issue worth exploring to study its im-pact on ultimate shareholder behavior.Taking panel data of 523 non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2022 in China as a sample,we have empirically tested the promotion or suppression effects of debt financing on ultimate shareholder tunneling behavior when considering the threshold effects and regulatory effects of internal control quality.It's found in the study that:(1)bank debt,commer-cial credit,and long-term debt have a significant promoting effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling behavior;when the quality of internal control exceeds the threshold values of 860.160,873.700,and 873.700,respectively,the effect is reduced;(2)short-term debt has a significant inhibitory effect on ultimate shareholder hollowing behavior;when the quality of internal control is greater than the threshold value of 873.700,the effect is enhanced;(3)commercial credit,long-term debt,and bank debt promote the ultimate shareholder tunneling behavior in state-owned enterprises,which is re-versely adjusted by the quality of internal control.The research findings provide a reference basis for listed companies to formulate sound internal governance environment strategies and develop reason-able lending strategies for creditors to promote high-quality development of listed companies.
Debt financingQuality of internal controlsUltimate controlling shareholdersPanel threshold modelStatic panel regression model
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
