Research on Incentives of Enterprise Low-carbon Technology Innovation Based on Carbon Trading System
Carbon trading system has become an important policy tool to achieve the target of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality and drive high quality development.This paper studies the low-carbon technolo-gy innovation decision-making of enterprises when enterprises interact in imperfectly competitive market.Aim-ing at the strategic interaction between leading enterprises and marginal enterprises in low-carbon technology innovation and terminal treatment under the carbon trading system,a stochastic evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the impact of random interference,innovation cost and compliance cost on the strategy selection of heterogeneous market power enterprises.The results show that market power affects the low-car-bon technology effect of environmental regulation.Specifically,there are differences in the innovation strategy selection of market power diverse enterprises after the introduction of carbon trading system.Leading enterpris-es are more inclined to low-carbon technology innovation strategy,and the impact of innovation cost on their strategy choices is most significant.Although marginal enterprises may prefer to low-carbon technology inno-vation strategy to some extent,it is easy to deviate due to strong random disturbance,high innovation cost and high compliance cost.Interestingly,moderate level of R&D spillover is conducive to encouraging marginal en-terprises to adopt low-carbon technology innovation strategy and the best R&D spillover level is 0.7.This paper provides implications for policy makers to perfect carbon trading system and formulate low-carbon innovation incentive policies.
Carbon trading systemLow-carbon technology innovationMarket powerStochastic evolutionary game model
万方数据
维普
