The Evolutionary Game Study of Quadruple Interactions in Online Food Safety Supervision Involving New Media
Under the background of"Internet+",online food transactions have the characteristics of virtuality,scale,concealment and network,which aggravates the information asymmetry between reg-ulators and stakeholders.Online food operators use information advantages to produce and sell fake and deteriorated food,which makes the problem of online food safety increasingly serious.Based on the as-sumption of information difference and bounded rationality of online food stakeholders,an SD four-party evolutionary game model of'online food operator-online food trading third-party platform-government supervision department-consumer'is constructed to analyze the impact of online food stakeholders'behav-ioral strategies on online food safety.The results show that the absence of online food market supervision is the key to the confusion of online food trading market.The participation of game subjects such as gov-ernment supervision departments,third-party platforms for online food trading and consumers in online food safety supervision is restricted by cost.Strengthening the supervision of government supervision departments and third-party platforms for online food trading,improving consumers'identification ability and new media exposure probability and force can weaken the motivation of online food operators to pro-vide low-quality products,but the evolution process of mixed game strategy shows a cyclical trend.When the comprehensive income of network food operators producing and selling low-quality food is lower than the loss of brand and reputation,it can inhibit their willingness to provide low-quality products.
New mediaOnline food safetyRegulationFour-party evolutionary gameSystem dynamics
万方数据
维普
