监管机构随机现场检查能有效遏制关联交易吗?
Can Random on-site Inspections by Regulators Effectively Impede Related Party Transactions?
杜莉 1周冬华2
作者信息
- 1. 深圳市龙岗区国有资产监督管理局,广东 深圳 518001;江西财经大学 会计学院,江西 南昌 330013
- 2. 江西财经大学 会计学院,江西 南昌 330013
- 折叠
摘要
证券监管是维护资本市场健康有序发展的重要手段.从证监机构预防性监管的视角出发,检验了证监机构随机现场检查的治理效应.研究发现,随机现场检查能够通过提高内部控制质量与公司治理水平,抑制关联交易.这种抑制作用主要体现在利益流出型、涉及担保抵押、股权交易和提供或接受劳务的关联交易事项中.当企业面临的外部治理更强,也即由十大会计师事务所审计、面临更多媒体报道时,这种抑制作用更为显著.论文的研究结论为监管机构深入创新监管方式提供了经验证据.
Abstract
Securities regulation is a crucial means to maintain the healthy and orderly develop-ment of the capital market.From the perspective of preventive supervision by securities regulatory agencies,this study examines the governance effects of the random on-site inspections.The research finds that random on-site inspections can inhibit related party transactions by enhancing internal con-trol quality and corporate governance.This inhibitory effect is primarily manifested in related party transactions involving outflows of interests,guarantees and mortgages,equity trading,and the pro-vision or receipt of labor services.This inhibitory effect becomes more pronounced when firms face stronger external governance,specifically when audited by top ten accounting firms and subject to more media coverage.The findings of this paper provide empirical evidence for regulatory agencies to further innovate their regulatory approaches.
关键词
随机现场检查/关联交易/公司治理Key words
Random on-site inspection/Related party transactions/Corporate governance引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据