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碳普惠体系中政府双向税收优惠策略研究

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基于碳普惠体系建设视角,构建政府、居民和平台三方行为策略的演化博弈模型,剖析政府实施双向税收优惠政策、居民参与碳减排项目和平台积极运营的影响机理.结果显示:居民参与碳减排项目是政府实施个人所得税优惠政策和平台积极运营的前提,同时受到初始碳币奖励、绿色价值感知收益与个税专项附加扣除额度的促进作用;平台的企业所得税减免额度、积极运营经济收益与声誉收益越高,积极运营成本越低,其越有可能积极运营;政府实施个人和企业双向税收优惠策略能够激励居民自愿参与、平台积极运营,但是受到社会声誉收益的促进作用与政策实施成本的抑制作用.由此,建议政府建立居民碳减排的个税专项附加扣除动态调整机制、实施平台积极运营的企业所得税分类分级减免政策.
Bidirectional Preferential Tax Strategies of Chinese Government in the Carbon Inclusion System
From the perspective of carbon inclusive system construction,a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed among government departments,residents,and platforms,and the influ-encing factors were analyzed of government departments'two preferential tax strategies,residents'par-ticipation in carbon reduction projects and platforms'active operation.The results verify that residents'participation is the prerequisite for government departments to implement preferential individual income tax strategy and platforms to operate actively.Residents are more willing to voluntarily participate in car-bon reduction projects when they receive more initial carbon currency,perceive stronger green value,get higher income tax deduction.Regard to the platforms,a moderate initial carbon currency reward is helpful for them to actively operate and residents to voluntarily participate.Their active operations can also be promoted by increasing income tax deduction,economic and reputation benefits,as well as decreasing active operating cost.The implementation of two preferential tax strategies of government departments can incentivize residents'voluntary participation and active operation of platforms,which is positively affected by social reputation benefit and negatively influenced by the cost of preferential tax policy.There-fore,government departments are suggested to establish a dynamic adjustment mechanism for the special individual income tax deduction about carbon reductions and implement a classified and tiered corporate income tax reduction policy for the active operation of platforms.

Residents'carbon emissions reductionCarbon inclusionPreferential taxEvolu-tionary game

郭道燕、王雪健、邹绍辉

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西安科技大学 管理学院,陕西 西安 710054

复旦大学 管理学院,上海 200433

居民碳减排 碳普惠 税收优惠 演化博弈

国家自然科学基金项目教育部人文社会科学研究项目陕西省社会科学基金项目中国博士后科学基金项目

7210420021YJC6300332020R0552022M710726

2024

管理现代化
中国管理现代化研究会

管理现代化

CSTPCDCHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.676
ISSN:1003-1154
年,卷(期):2024.44(4)