管理现代化2024,Vol.44Issue(6) :157-166.DOI:10.19634/j.cnki.11-1403/c.2024.06.015

碳配额分配策略对绿色与非绿色产品制造商竞争的影响

Effects of Carbon Quota Allocation Strategies on Competition between Green and Non-green Product Manufacturers

尚文芳 谷鑫涛 李涛
管理现代化2024,Vol.44Issue(6) :157-166.DOI:10.19634/j.cnki.11-1403/c.2024.06.015

碳配额分配策略对绿色与非绿色产品制造商竞争的影响

Effects of Carbon Quota Allocation Strategies on Competition between Green and Non-green Product Manufacturers

尚文芳 1谷鑫涛 1李涛2
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作者信息

  • 1. 郑州大学 商学院,河南 郑州 450001
  • 2. 郑州大学 管理学院,河南 郑州 450001
  • 折叠

摘要

在碳交易政策背景下,考虑市场需求不确定性和绿色与非绿色产品制造商之间的价格博弈,引入不同碳配额分配方式,研究其对两制造商减排和定价决策的影响.通过构建并对比分析不同碳配额分配方式下绿色与非绿色产品制造商的博弈模型,得出如下结论:(1)历史法和基准线法下,市场规模越大,减排难度越低,单位产品的碳减排量就越高,且市场规模增大对绿色产品需求的促进作用大于非绿色产品.(2)历史基准线混合法下单位产品的碳减排量介于历史法和基准线法之间,且随着基准线法所占比重的增大而增大.奖惩机制下单位产品的碳减排量随着奖惩系数的增大呈现先增后减的凹性变化,且始终大于历史法下的减排量.(3)历史法下绿色产品的市场份额小于基准线法下,历史基准线混合法下的市场份额介于二者之间.奖惩机制可以在增大绿色产品需求的同时降低非绿色产品的需求,使其获得大于基准线法的市场份额.论文研究有助于为政府碳配额分配策略制订提供参考,为供应链成员的决策提供依据.

Abstract

In the context of carbon trading policy,considering the uncertainty of market demand and the price game between green and non-green product manufacturers,different carbon quota alloca-tion methods were introduced to study their impact on emission reduction and pricing decisions of the two manufacturers.Through the construction and comparative analysis of the game model of green and non-green product manufacturers under different carbon quota allocation methods,the following con-clusions are drawn:(1)Under the historical method and the baseline method,the larger the market size,the lower the emission reduction difficulty,the higher the carbon emission reduction per unit product,and the increase in market size has a greater promoting effect on the demand for green products than that of non-green products.(2)The carbon emission reduction per unit product under the historical baseline mixed method is between the historical method and the baseline method,and increases with the increase of the proportion of the baseline method.Under the mechanism of reward and punishment,the carbon emission reduction per unit product increases first and then decreases with the increase of the reward and punishment coefficient,and is always greater than the emission reduction under the historical method.(3)The market share of green products under the historical method is smaller than that under the baseline method,and the market share under the mixed historical baseline method is between the two.The reward and punishment mechanism can increase the demand for green products while reducing the demand for non-green products,so that they can obtain more market share than the baseline method.This paper is helpful to provide reference for the government's carbon quota allocation strategy and provide basis for supply chain members'decision-making.

关键词

历史法/基准线法/历史基准线混合法/制造商竞争

Key words

Historical law/Reference line method/Historical reference line mixing method/Manufacturer competition

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出版年

2024
管理现代化
中国管理现代化研究会

管理现代化

CSTPCDCHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.676
ISSN:1003-1154
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