Bridging Government and Market:The "Brokerage" Behavior of Local SOEs
Local state-owned enterprises(SOEs)occupy a pivotal position in the national economic system,and their behav-ior in China's economic development has attracted much attention.Captured in the case of the development of national development zones,local SOEs have demonstrated"brokering"behaviors that bridge local governments and market players.Local SOEs act as agents of the dual interests of local governments and market players,bridging the gap between local governments and market players.In this regard,local SOEs have demonstrated"brokerage"behaviors such as recommend-ing reliable projects,stimulating the desire to get rich,supervising the fulfillment of promises,and enhancing the commu-nication between the government and the business sector,thus building a bridge between the local government and the market entity and promoting the integration of the interests of the two sides.The effectiveness of local SOEs'"brokerage"behavior is attributed to the fact that local SOEs build trust between local governments and market players,giving both parties subjective certainty about each other,thus changing constraints and opportunities.Local SOEs also seek more op-portunities for development.In the final analysis,the"brokerage"behavior of local SOEs aims to fill the vacuum between local governments and market players under the existing system.The"brokerage"behavior of local SOEs provides a new explanation for their role in China's economic development.This informal bridging mechanism helps local governments and market players to overcome the uncertainty problem and responds to the skepticism of"the state advancing and the people retreating".
Local state-owned enterprisesLocal governmentsMarket playersDual-interest agency"Brokerage" behavior
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