Why is a"Phenomenology of History"Impossible:on Lukács's Threefold Critique of Heidegger
In response to the academia's long-standing exposition of Marx's"historical materialism"through Heidegger's"existential phenomenology",the approach of"historical phenomenology"entails reexamining Lukács'critiques of Heidegger,both domestically and internationally,which holds significant reference value.Lukács offers a threefold critique of Heidegger's philosophy:First,Lukács states in an internal critical manner that Heidegger's view of history is"self-contradictory";second,Lukács suggests that it is the flaws in Heidegger's phenomenological method that lead to his"self-contradictory"view of history;in the third critique,Lukács argues that Heidegger,in order to compensate for the emptiness of"Being",confuses the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and fills the objective of"Being"with the subjective"Dasein",moving towards an anthropological stance instead and ultimately oscillating between two kinds of nihilism.Lukács's threefold critique of Heidegger's thought reveals the crux of the Heideggerian"phenomenology of history"and is important for examining the critical connection between Marx's historical materialism and the phenomenological tradition.
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