The Profit Allocation of Alliances Based on the Multi-weighted Shapley Value
Profit allocation is the key to the success of cooperation in alliances. In addressing issues of profit allocation in alliances, the previously proposed weighted Shapley value assigns only one weight to each player for all activities in an alliance. However, a player may have different bargaining power and contribution in different activities. Hence, it is more appropriate that a player is associated with different weights in different activities. This article tries to propose a new model called multi-weighted Shapley value. In the model, a cooperative n-person game is decomposed into a new set of simple games in the sense of Shapley-equivalence. Each simple game is associated with a vector of weights determined by roles, contribution, bargaining power and potential risk of players. It implies that a player who involves in multiple activities will be included in several simple games and assigned with multiple weights. Based on the weights, an equation is further built to calculate the multi-weighted Shapley value. In the end,an example is presented to illustrate how the Shapley value and the multi-weighted Shapley value work.
allianceprofit allocationshapley valuemulti-weighted shapley valuecooperative games
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